

THE MIDDLE KINGDOM AS DEPICTED IN THE US STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS IN 2010-2019

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Abstract. The article's goal is to summarize the perception of China in key US strategic documents in the period of 2010-2019. The rationale behind the selection of such a period was based on an assumption, that the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense upon order from the President, marked and announced, what has been nick-named the „Pacific Pivot“. To get a better understanding of the dynamics of the perception the author suggests a one step backwards move to the 2010 National Security Strategy issued by President Obama on the verge of withdrawing large US contingents from Middle East and just after receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. To meet the goal, author will follow the changes in China-oriented parts of the strategic documents issued by the US Presidents and the Secretaries of Defence until the recently announced NSS and National Defense Strategy.

Keywords: US-Sino Relations, US Strategy, Pacific Pivot, China's Rise.

Introduction

Over the past three decades the World has allegedly been enjoying a relatively stable and peaceful period, which, especially from Poland's perspective was a direct result of the collapse of Soviet Union. This milestone opened an interesting chapter in the history not only for our region, but also for the whole globe, as the United States for the first time in its history had no direct competitor in its path to global hegemony. Spending one third of the global defense funds, the US has been a dominant security provider for several regions, including Asia and Pacific. In this particular area local players have been enjoying stability guaranteed by the deployment of US forces (e.g. South Korea) or have been benefitting from secure trade routes guaranteed by the operation of the US Navy.

Such a freedom of trade, which was planned and designed to benefit US companies as early as in the nineteenth century¹, generated an enormous boost to the Chinese economy. The Chinese, known for their traditionally long-term approach to planning, but also their skills to make the best out of every opportunity² transformed each and every cent of the favourable trade balance into an enormous reserve of US dollars, which has for decades been pumped into numerous local and global

¹ A.W. Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States*, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938, p. 5.

² M. Łubina, *Niedźwiedź w cieniu smoka*, Księgarnia Akademicka 2014, p. 52.

initiatives resulting in a tangible leverage transforming China into a regional and global player.

From Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms, and especially in the post-Cold War period, when pressure from the Soviet Union was gone, one could easily observe China's emergence from a destination of investment and provider of cheap labour force to a dominant and influential economy capable of supporting its policies and goals with substantial funds, including a sharp increase in military modernisation efforts³.

Such a development encouraged China to make audacious territorial claims in the regions, where security and stability was provided and guaranteed by the United States in general and its continuous naval presence in particular. Although the history of disputes in the South China Sea dates back to the nineteenth century⁴, the conflict on the sea's islands has gained new momentum with the Chinese rise to power and its declaration of unchangeable policy of territorial sovereignty⁵.

This declaration, combined with changes in US global posture and military presence in the period of 2009-2012 marks a beginning of a new era in the global order, which will see a growing tension between China and US.

The article's goal is to examine the changes in the perception of China and Chinese development from the US perspective with a focus on security and defence affairs. In order to gain a better understanding of the changes, strategic documents of US civilian authorities from the executive branch, to include the presidential National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Department of Defense's National Defense Strategy (NDS).

Statutory Requirements for Strategic Documents

The President of the United States is statutorily required to formulate and announce and submit to Congress his/her National Security Strategy by provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act⁶ (GWA) not later than 150 days after inauguration, and annually with every Presidential Budget Request.

³ G. Segal, *Does China Matter?*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1999-09-01/does-china-matter>, retrieved July 7, 2018.

⁴ https://www.cfr.org/interactives/chinas-maritime-disputes?cid=otr-marketing_use-china_sea_InfoGuide#!/chinas-maritime-disputes?cid=otr-marketing_use-china_sea_InfoGuide, retrieved July 7, 2018.

⁵ <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/30/AR2010073005664.html?noredirect=on>, retrieved July 7, 2018.

⁶ Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols Act), P.L. 99-433, § 603, Provisions of the Act have been included into the US Code of Laws under: Title 50, U.S. Code, § 3043.

The President is obliged to present his views on the global goals and interest vital for national security; international policy, commitments as well as military capabilities required to deter potential aggressors in the process of NSS implementation; short and long-term use of political, economic and military means as well as other elements of national power necessary to meet the goals of NSS. Above that one will find the President's assessment of the state's capability to implement the NSS and other elements he/she may find important.

The Ends/Ways/Means approach is clearly visible in most of the documents in history and in the period of interest, however, also noticeable is the fact the NSS's are resources-unconstrained, or refer to them in a very general manner⁷.

The NSS is used by the President to set priorities for the Administration, but also to inform Congress, internal and global audiences of his/her visions and plans. As such, the document is clearly an element of strategic communication, but also a tool of influence and inspiration for lower level strategies and planning processes.

In the period under examination statutory requirements for the National Defense Strategy were deeply revised, with a sharp turn introduced in 2017. Originally, the NDS was a part of the Quadrennial Defense Reviews⁸ conducted and published, as the name suggests, every four years.

The QDRs completed until 2014 were required to contain the National Defense Strategy and they did, however they were receiving a growing criticism from think tanks and even the Congress. Main accusations were including the fact that the Reviews were time and resources heavy, producing very little for the US defense system to build on⁹. As a result the SoD, starting from 2018, is required to produce the National Defense only, with the requirements introduced into the US Code¹⁰.

It is worth noticing that the QDR's were accompanied by reports of the Independent Panel – a group of defence experts nominated by the Congress. This, combined with the CJCS's comments and risk assessment formulated a broader spectrum of opinions on the results of each Review.

⁷ Author claims that the resources (especially financial), although not explicitly present in most strategies, are not omitted by the President, and White House's approach to this aspect is observable in the Presidential Budget Request.

⁸ Introduced by the FY 1997 NDAA, P.L. 104-201, § 923, introduced into the US Code as a result of the FY 2000 NDAA, removed by the FY 2017 NDAA.

⁹ <https://www.defensenews.com/home/2016/04/25/qdr-dead-in-2017-defense-policy-bill/>, retrieved April 23, 2018. Apart from the QDR's drawbacks mentioned in the quoted article, one should bear in mind that even the DoD and associated organisations were critical of the process. E.g. the National Defense Panel in the report accompanying the 2014 QDR was pointing a finger at the DoD for not noticing the Russian preparations for the annexation of Crimea and invasion in Ukraine.

¹⁰ US Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 2, § 113. The NDS contains: Key DoD Missions, DoD's perception of the strategic environment, strategic framework for prioritization with risk assessment, tasks for armed services, force structure and priority acquisitions and investments.

The table below lists the strategic documents in focus in a chronological order.

YEAR	AUTHOR	TITLE	ABBREVIATION
2010	The President, Barack Obama	National Security Strategy	2010 NSS
2010	Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates	Quadrennial Defense Review	2010 QDR
2012	Secretary of Defence, Leon Panetta	Defense Strategic Guidance: Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense	2012 DSG
2014	Secretary of Defence, Chuck Hagel	Quadrennial Defense Review	2014 QDR
2015	The President, Barack Obama	National Security Strategy	2015 NSS
2017	The President, Donald Trump	National Security Strategy	2017 NSS
2018	Secretary of Defense, Jim Mattis	National Defense Strategy	2018 NDS

Global and Regional Contexts

The period in focus was preceded by the so called „Post 9/11” decade, which followed the first decade after the end of Cold War. There are claims among the international affairs experts that the focus on Middle East resulting from the WTC attacks, prevented US Administrations from paying to China the attention it had intended to prior to its deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq. Indeed, some of the provisions of the NSS from before 2010 put stress on China and its economic and social development as top priorities for the US. China – former opponent from the Cold War – was on the verge of a dynamic development and on its path to becoming a global player.

The role attributed to Beijing was especially visible in the trade relations, with trade always the number one priority in the US approach to China¹¹, but also in the regional context, where China is perceived by Presidents Clinton and Bush Jr. as an important pillar of regional stability.

The traditional thorn in the US–Chinese relations – Taiwan – is also present in US strategies at the turn of centuries. The White House promises its support to Chinese development (social and economic), but also assumes that disagreement on Taiwan will not stop Washington from investing in the security and development

¹¹ US played a dominant role and advocated for admission of China to WTO.

of Taiwan and its people. The stance is maintained in the 2010 NSS, which states that Taiwan, although a source of disagreements, remains in Washington's focus, especially from the perspective of human rights.

President Obama no longer has to predict the rise of China – in his 2010 NSS the rise is already a fact and China is already a centre of influence with global ramifications. As such, China – according to the Strategy – is to be an US partner in a mutually beneficial cooperation. Areas of this cooperation – although pertaining to other potential partners, e.g. Russia and EU – include nuclear non-proliferation, climate change and economic instability. These issues are considered crucial for the globe and no one nation can cope with them on its own and are to be dealt with by a growing number of influential players – an observation that is present in 2010 QDR, where Secretary Gates lists China as one the most rapidly developing player linking the country's more tangible military presence in the region to an increase in its economic potential.

The 2010 NSS also addresses China indirectly. With Beijing's open and firm stance on its spheres of influence and territorial possessions¹², President Obama makes solemn pledges to his country's Pacific Allies¹³, to which he guarantees US engagement, by stating: „In partnership with our allies, the United States is helping to offer a future of security and integration to all Asian nations and to uphold and extend fundamental rights and dignity to all of its people". Obviously, there was no discrepancy between President Obama and Secretary Gates, with the latter putting a strong emphasis on Australia.

2012 saw the announcement of the Defense Strategic Guidance (2012 DSG). Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, as the document was called, had three main processes as its driving factors. First – the White House was in the process of planning the withdrawal of troops from Middle East. Second – The 2011 Budget Control Act was urging the Pentagon to generate considerable savings. Third – President Obama decided to shift the focal point of his Administration to the Pacific Ocean.

The document continues to put a strong emphasis on regional partnerships and influences is very often present in the documents under consideration. Sometimes it is China that is listed as a potential partner against a security concern – e.g. against the North Korean threat (2012 DSG).

President Obama issued the 2015 NSS in order to shape the future of security and summarise two key decisions of his tenure – withdrawal from Afghanistan and the strategic shift to the Pacific. In the aspects of Pacific Pivot in the 2015 NSS, President Obama was extremely appreciative of the level of cooperation with China and assessed further economic development resulting from the rebalance to

¹² The Nine-Dash Line and Chains of Islands.

¹³ Japan, South Korea, Thailand and The Philippines.

Pacific. In the Strategy China is also praised for its input into global efforts against the greenhouse gases. In 2015, however, China, although not on par with US yet, is perceived as stakeholder in what may in the future emerge as a multipolar world. The post-Cold War order is no longer to be taken for granted and China's spheres of influence (lawful and claimed) are seeds of potential future instabilities. This observation is balanced by the appreciation President Obama expresses for the agreement between Beijing and ASEAN on the code of conduct in the South China Sea. Moreover, White House expects China to co-stabilize the Pacific region – a place and source of economic growth for regional and global populations¹⁴. And, while he remains realistic about competition with the Middle Kingdom, he also believes that the states are far from being on a collision course.

In 2017 President Trump announced his NSS, which by some was regarded as a dramatic departure from previous policies of Washington vis-a-vis Beijing. The latter being accused of challenging the generously funded Pax Americana and overthrowing foundations of free and fair trade to its favour¹⁵. Named a „revisionist power” over its deeds, China is listed as a top threat to US prosperity. It is worth noticing that such a contest for power is perceived as a regular historical phenomenon by the 2017 NSS's author; however, China had been allowed to benefit too much from America's generosity in the previous years, much to the detriment of Washington's economic and technological advantages.

The competition with China is highlighted in the traditional regional context of Asia and Pacific, but also in the contexts of other regions, especially as China is building its network of partners among developing countries around the world. Such an approach is observed (and condemned) in the Western Hemisphere, for example in Cuba and Venezuela, where an influx of Chinese governmental loans is observed. The hunt for new technologies through investment in key industries of developed countries (e.g. European) is also observed with concern.

Africa is also listed as an area of Chinese influence. In this context a dynamic change from a small investor to a leading trade partner throughout two decades is highlighted. The continent may, however, count on US assistance in opposing the extractive economy of Beijing.

As much as Washington is open and willing to cooperate with Beijing, it strongly condemns the aggressive military developments in the South China Sea, where military outpost are used to manipulate (endanger) free flow of trade.

Both trends (influence on flow of trade and acquisition of technologies) will be challenged by the US in cooperation with its partners, as promised by President

¹⁴ The 2015 NSS states that over the upcoming five years, more than half on non-US generated production will originate in the Pacific states.

¹⁵ In the context of challenging U.S., Russia is also mentioned.

Trump. Trump also promises US's Pacific partners appropriate assistance in defence against Chinese claims and aspirations.

Military Context

Ever since China's rise appeared on Washington's radar, strategic documents of civilian and military authorities have highlighted the need for transparency and mutual understanding. Certain mechanisms for that were already promised by US and PRC Presidents after their reciprocal visits to Beijing and Washington in 1997 and 1998. The visits added hope to Washington's expectations, which were expressed in the Presidential 2000 NSS.

President Obama continues Washington's official pressure on Beijing to increase transparency in its modernisation efforts. The dynamics of the process is at the same time appreciated by Secretary Gates, who welcomes potential positive influence China may have in and on the region, with emphasis on lack of transparency also made by the DoD in the 2010 QDR. The transparency should pertain to both military expenditures but also decision making processes in Beijing. Such pressure is present in each and every Presidential and DoD's document in the period in focus. It remains Washington's crucial concern even, when cooperation with China is assessed as positively as in, e.g., the 2015 NSS.

The 2010 NSS assumes that technological advantage of the US military over its potential rivals must be maintained. The President also presumes the increase of US capabilities to operate in anti-access environments, which will be created by both simple methods of non-state actors but first and foremost sophisticated technologies of state players. Although potential Chinese threats to US interests and dominance are highlighted in 2012, the DSG puts a highlight on bilateral military cooperation with China as an element of building strong bilateral relations.

The Independent Panel in their Report¹⁶ on the 2010 QDR is generally consistent with the original results. The development of Asian countries is listed as a source of potential conflicts, but only as the second priority concern. Although far from confrontational, the Report's wording makes it clear that some conflicts will require a decisive and forceful actions by the US. In this context the Panel sheds floodlights on the military developments in China (and India), which are decreasing the traditional US military dominant advantage, but is (are) not willing to take some of the military burden of stabilising the region. The Panel also emphasises that China's development would not have been possible without prior actions by the US to stabilise the region.

¹⁶ *The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel*, US Institute of Peace, Washington 2010.

In 2012, with the DSG, the Department of Defense is clear about a possibility of China's growth interfering with vital US interests in the Pacific region. Also with Beijing's development of asymmetric A2/AD capabilities, the US is forced to shift its focus to the Pacific and, at the same time, make considerable investments and develop the Joint Operational Access concept so that its military has the freedom of access and manoeuvrability regardless of difficulties imposed by a potential regional player.

This stance is maintained in the 2014 QDR, where Secretary Hagel envisions a continued Strategic Shift to the Pacific made by the DoD in the pursuit of goals set by the National Security Strategy. Partnerships with traditional allies will be further developed, but also the Air/Sea approach – the cornerstone of which is the disruption of A2/AD capabilities – is continued, especially with focus on cyber technologies possibly used by China apart from traditional A2/AD operations/weaponry.

China's capabilities are often listed as the rationale behind further development of Missile Defence systems of the US. They are supposed to minimise a potential threat from Chinese ballistic missiles developed at a rapid pace.

The A2/AD capabilities are highlighted by President Trump as limiting US's advantage in time of conflict, but also limiting freedom of operation in peacetime. Moreover he highlights the technological development of the Chinese military as a process driven by US developed technologies, which were acquired, for example via unconstrained admission of Chinese students to US universities and laboratories.

Rhetoric and Execution

In 2010-2019 and with reference to earlier years, one can clearly observe a significant change in the way China with its global and regional roles have been perceived by Washington. From a potentially important player in the unipolar world order after the Cold War, one that requires US assistance in multinational institutions and organisations to a country that can directly and indirectly challenge the US-funded Pax Americana globally and regionally.

The aforementioned claim that US „lost” a decade of appropriate approach to China because of its involvement in the Middle East is only partially true. The overall value of trade – the key factor behind US-Chinese relations¹⁷ – has been growing dynamically. However, as in previous periods, the balance is favourable for Beijing, and exports of US goods to China was definitely lagging behind imports.¹⁸

¹⁷ A.W. Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States*, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938, p. 15, also: А.А. Нагорный, А.Б. Парканский, США и Китай: экономические и научно-технические аспекты китайской политики Вашингтона, Moscow 1982.

¹⁸ <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html>, retrieved July 14, 2018.

The increase in military capabilities of the PLA during the post-Cold War period, combined with Beijing's territorial claims and its peculiar understanding of the rights of a country in its Exclusive Economic Zones required a firm response from Washington. The „Pacific Pivot” was such a response. It is, however, a must to acknowledge that a strategy alone is nothing without appropriate execution. Also, the strategy itself is always bound to being far from perfect, as it reflects the dynamics and compromises of current authorities. As stated by Don Snider: “The problem with such documents is that they often create the false impression that strategy formulation is a rational and systemic process. In fact, strategy formulation both within the executive branch and between the executive branch and Congress is an intensely political process from which national strategy emerges after protracted bargaining and compromise”.¹⁹

As such, the documents fall under criticism from the authors' opponents, but sometimes even from within their own political circles.

Apart from classification and secrecy, execution must be taken into account. And there, one may observe meaningful discrepancies.

The 2012 Pacific Pivot received much of its criticism for being actually a document that was directing the US defense community to achieve less, with even less resources. The idea was primarily focused on generating considerable savings on the DoD's side,²⁰ and military activities that followed (i.e. changing balance between the Atlantic and Pacific fleets), were not enough²¹ to guarantee the success of the strategic re-balancing. The Obama's Administrations' „Pivot” has been criticised, among many other reasons, for lack of an appropriate execution. It is performed in the shadow of the 2011 Budget Control Act that preceded the 2012 DSG left the Department of Defense with limited funds and a guillotine of sequestration, should the budgeting process not meet the budget caps. But such accusations were present even earlier, e.g. in the Independent Panel Report to the 2010 QDR. Experts were claiming that although valuable and timely, the „Pivot” was not accompanied by appropriate plan to develop the US Navy and saturate it with required capabilities and enablers to operate in the increasingly demanding environment of the Pacific.²² In the heat of battle for defence cuts, the US Administration was, however planning to shift the responsibilities between the Atlantic and Pacific fleets, with the number of ships operating around Asia to grow to almost 70 by 2020.²³

¹⁹ D.M. Snider, *The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision*, Strategic Studies Institute, 1995.

²⁰ <https://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/1/restoring-american-power-sasc-chairman-john-mccain-releases-defense-budget-white-paper>, retrieved April 23, 2018.

²¹ <https://thediplomat.com/2014/03/the-us-navy-and-the-pivot-less-means-less/>, retrieved May 12, 2018.

²² *The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, 2010 Independent Panel..., p. X.

²³ S. Kikuchi, H. Arakaki, *The United States*, in: *East Asian Strategic Review 2015*, The Japan Times, Tokyo, 2015.

In the case of President Trump the discrepancy was even more pronounced. Following a Department of Commerce's ban on US supplies to ZTE, the company was in danger of losing several thousands of jobs, a fate that was to be shared by Huawei, which, by a Department of Defense's ban was not allowed to sell its mobile devices in US bases and defense installations around the globe. The move seemed to be in line with the provisions of Trump's NSS, who put an emphasis on malicious activities by Chinese authorities, military and businesses and promised to act accordingly. It was the US President, much to the surprise of commentators, who after the revelation of potential losses for the companies stemming from the bans, declared openly to search for a solution (in cooperation with President Xi) to limit the negative impact.²⁴

There are claims among foreign relations experts that President Trump's rather harsh rhetoric on China and its stance vis-a-vis US is very likely to destroy the fruits of President Obama's Pacific Pivot.

Harsh rhetoric, however, is not an unknown phenomenon in the US-Sino relations, regardless of its phase. On the verge of rapprochement in the Nixon's era, the US President, with his predecessor, Lyndon Johnson, were called „foxes of the same lair”²⁵ – an emphasis of Beijing's alleged lack of hope for better relations with Washington, even after changes in the White House. What came afterwards was a new era in US-Sino relations, which saw a dynamic development of China and a further decline of the number one enemy of the US – the Soviet Union.

The presidencies of G. W. Bush Jr. are remembered for his War on Terror in the post 9/11 era, but in the context of the approach to China, he also started with rather harsh wording, to include “strategic competitor” and moved towards a “strategic collaborator” by the end of his second tenure. The eight years saw the value of imports from China almost triple in nominal terms²⁶ and number of high level meetings was above any other presidency since Nixon's.²⁷

It stands to reason, however, that the analysed strategies are developed in both classified and unclassified versions with the most crucial findings and plans being available to US civilian and military authorities exclusively. The unclassified elements of the US Strategies are, as mentioned earlier, a part of the STRATCOM process, which in the case of US-Sino duo is both of an international and inter-cultural nature. Both Presidents – Obama and Trump – in the core messages of their NSS's were offering cooperation with China and were putting a large focus on the Middle

²⁴ <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/foreign/trump-working-with-xi-jinping-to-salvage-jobs-at-chinese-telecom-giant-zte>, retrieved July 17, 2018.

²⁵ J. Mann, *About Face. A History of American's Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton*, 1998, quoted after: <https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/first/m/mann-face.html>, retrieved July 17, 2018.

²⁶ <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html>, retrieved July 17, 2018.

²⁷ CHU Shulong, *Bilateral Dialogue Mechanism and Sino-American Relations*, in: *Sino-American Relations: Challenges Ahead*, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2013, p. 116.

Kingdom. The Pacific Pivot, as announced by Barack Obama, however, was interpreted by Chinese and Russian commentators as a sign of weakness.²⁸

From this point of view the almost pugnacious offer of cooperation from the position of strength made by President Trump may be perceived as an attempt at rebuilding the allegedly scattered image of the American superpower in Asia.

Some claim that Trump's stance and wording and policies that will follow, are America's last resort to contain the rise of China. The Middle Kingdom may, without such a containment, rise to power even sooner than expected, and, at some point in the future, may challenge the US more decisively and painfully in a process described as "power transition".²⁹

Conclusions

Even if it is the case, the US Administration, current and future, have to play their cards with due sensitivity, especially those on issues as fragile as "One China Policy", which, although supported by the 2017 NSS, was questioned by President Trump in his interventions during campaign and upon inauguration. China, obviously, perceives all the discrepancies between US (and other countries) from its own point of view. One has to remember, that Beijing's point of view is deeply rooted in its willingness to reverse and avenge the Century of Humiliation, what increases the Middle Kingdom's sensitivity over certain issues.

It can never be stated enough that most of execution of a strategy, or preparation thereof, is done in a classified or secret manner. The statutorily required strategies and reports to Congress are accompanied by classified versions and/or annexes. The opening and decisive moments are also those prepared and done secretly and such was the case with President Nixon's new opening with China, which started with a simple note to his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, in which Nixon insisted on "rapprochement" with China being started secretly.³⁰ Probably, the next steps of approach to China – evolutionary or revolutionary – are currently being

²⁸ Щелкунов Д., Светоносов К., *Отношения США и КНР*, https://mgimo.ru/upload/docs_3/Welkynov-Svetonosov_usa-china.pdf, retrieved July 11 2018. The 2012 DSG may be interpreted as being of conciliatory tone, however, one must read it in conjunction with earlier Presidential decisions, e.g. the approval of over \$6 bln worth of military sales to Taiwan which would put the Washington-Beijing relations on hold for almost a year.

²⁹ A point made by Hao Youfan in 2010 in his introduction to: *Sino-American Relations: Challenges Ahead*. Hao expects this view to be predominant among some „hawkish” members of the Republican Party, who, in turn, may push then and future Administrations to contain China, until the US posses a decisive advantage.

³⁰ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, Part 1, China, 1969-1972*, eds. S.E. Phillips and E.C. Keefer (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 3.

developed in the Cabinet and are highly unlikely to make it to the public anytime soon, especially in the form of provisions of any of the strategic documents in focus.

Given the above – excerpts, opinions and historical connotations – it is way too early to judge the future of US-Sino relations or the long term effects the strategies have had and will have on them. One thing we may be certain about is the fact that China is now a fully developed subject of international relations and, and as such, is highly unlikely to change its path of development or cancel its earlier claims as a result of US Strategies alone.

There have always been and will be discrepancies between the countries, however, even after the release of 2017 NSS, Beijing, apart from disapproval of certain parts of the Strategy, was emphasizing the inevitability of cooperation between two states.³¹

Without a doubt, China will have a significant (sometimes decisive) impact on bilateral relations with any partner, to include the United States.

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KRÓLESTWO ŚRODKA W DOKUMENTACH STRATEGICZNYCH USA W LATACH 2010-2019

Abstrakt. Celem artykułu jest podsumowanie percepcji Chin w kluczowych amerykańskich dokumentach strategicznych w okresie 2010-2019. Przesłanki wyboru takiego okresu opierały się na założeniu, że Strategiczne Wytyczne Obrony z 2012 r., wydane przez Sekretarza Obrony na polecenie Prezydenta, ogłosiły tak zwany „Pacific Pivot”. Aby lepiej zrozumieć dynamikę percepcji, autor sugeruje krok w tył w kierunku *Strategii bezpieczeństwa narodowego* z 2010 r. wydanej przez prezydenta Obamę na progu wycofywania dużych kontyngentów amerykańskich z Bliskiego Wschodu i tuż po otrzymaniu Pokojowej Nagrody Nobla. Aby osiągnąć ten cel, autor prześledził zmiany dotyczące Chin w części dokumentów strategicznych wydanych przez amerykańskich prezydentów i sekretarzy obrony – aż do niedawno ogłoszonych NSS i Strategii Obrony Narodowej.

Słowa kluczowe: relacje USA-Chiny, strategia USA, Pacific Pivot, Chiny.

³¹ http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-12/19/c_136838057.htm, retrieved July 17, 2018.